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ABSTRACT
The long and lucrative history of smuggling in the early m odern era linked New
World econom ies in defiance of imperial m andates. As British m erchants gained
increased legal and illegal a c c e s s to Spanish American ports, Bourbon reformers
adopted the anachronistic policy of coastal defen se via privateering. My work
a d d re ss e s the history of Bourbon-era privateers and their role in the outbreak of
the W ar of Jenkins’ Ear. By reading British accounts of the supposed brutality
they encountered at the h an d s of Spanish privateers against a tradition of
C aribbean maritime depredations and w idespread smuggling, my work
illuminates the w ays in which th e se high s e a s encounters challenged British
naval suprem acy and dem onstrated the changing nature of Bourbon policy in the
eighteenth century.
Inter-imperial com m ercial relations betw een the S panish and British in the
Am ericas brought together a diverse group of actors who defied the mercantilist
am bitions of their respective m onarchies. Spanish colonial residents, due to the
erratic arrival of the galleon fleet in the eighteenth century, d epended upon
predominantly Jam aican m erchants for the m ost basic necessities. For their part,
Jam aican interlopers u sed the licit slave trade of the asiento contract in order to
flood the S panish port cities with British m anufactured goods, thereby stimulating
the econom y of their own island. My thesis explores the nature of the contraband
trade in an effort to dem onstrate its necessity to the commercial survival of
various S panish and British American peripheries.
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Virtue in Corruption
Anchored near the channel of Bocachica, at the head of the largest amphibious
force organized to date, Admiral Edward Vernon opened an intriguing letter.1 Smuggled
out o f Cartagena de Indias’ jail by an escaped Turkish prisoner, the encrypted message
gave detailed information about the city’s defenses gathered by British captives held
there since the outbreak o f the War o f Jenkins’ Ear. The captives assured Vernon that,
“[tjhere is not half the difficulty that doth appear to you” in attacking the city.2 Both
Vernon and the captives shared the widespread British belief that Spanish Americans’
waning loyalty to M adrid made them an easy target. The bustling Caribbean contraband
trade carried on by British subjects in Spain’s colonies, in the minds o f British observers,
underscored the tenuous allegiance of Spanish Americans to their crown. A forest of
foreign masts crowding the bay of Cartagena throughout the early decades of the
eighteenth century further indicated to the British that the Spanish Empire was inept at
controlling its subjects. Capitalizing on that perceived bureaucratic incompetence,
Vernon’s siege o f Cartagena was seen as a formality to break open a Spanish American
port which, economically at least, was already assumed to be under British control.
As cannon fire echoed through the streets of Cartagena at the beginning of the
siege in 1741, Vernon’s informers would have eagerly awaited a prompt victory and their
release. The Admiral and his invasion force, however, “Gott more blows than Honour”
during the ordeal.3 Spanish American defenders, the same who the British assumed
would defect to their side, killed 643 of the British invaders who attempted to take the
1 Richard Harding, Am phibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century: The British Expedition to the West
Indies 1740-1742 (Rochester. NY 1991).
' Petition to Vernon from the English Prisoners in Cartagena (Copy) [April/M ay 1741] in Ranft, The
Vernon Papers, p. 235. (Harding 1991) (Ranft 1958)
3 Diary of Captain Benjamin Norton, Saturday, June 20, 1741 in (Jameson 1923), ed., Privateering and
Piracy in the Colonial Period: Illustrative D ocum ents (New York, NY 1923): 387.

Fort of St. Lazar.4 Vernon’s inglorious defeat at Cartagena proved to be one o f the more
embarrassing for the British during the W ar o f Jenkins’ Ear. The war itself was fought
largely for commercial reasons, sparked by British public outrage at the aggressive
seizures of Anglo-American vessels accused of smuggling by Spanish American guarda
costas patrolling the Caribbean.5 This same pre-war violence between British merchants
and guarda costas that brought Vernon to Cartagena in the first place should have
dissuaded him from any notion of a painless victory. However, as Vernon would discover
too late to salvage his invasion attempt, smuggling in Cartagena provided the city a
means of defense rather than the seeds of its supposed disloyalty to the Spanish crown.
Blindness to the benefits of contraband and the violent responses of Spanish American
corsairs proved disastrous for British officials at Cartagena.
Vernon’s invasion attempt was informed by a widespread belief among the
British that smuggling and imperial loyalty were mutually exclusive. Observers described
the trade through terms like vice, corruption, and degeneracy and historians have
followed the language of these sources in condemning Spanish American officials who
participated in the trade as self-serving and disloyal.6 However, this interpretation does

4 Ranft, The Vernon Papers, p. 17.
5 G uarda Costas were privateering vessels outfitted in Spanish American port cities to com bat the
widespread contraband trade.
6 Some of the eighteenth-century sources condem ning Spanish American officials’ participation in
contraband trade as corruption are: Jose del Campillo y Cossio, Nuevo sistema de gobierno econom ica para
la america (Universidad de los Andes, M erida, Venezuela, 1971, 1789); Jorge Juan, Antonio de Ulloa, and
David Barry, Noticias Secretas De Am erica (Londres: en la imprenta de R. Taylor, 1826); and Antonio
Julian, S.J., La Perla de la America, Provincia de Santa Marta (Edicion facsimilar) (Academia
Colom biana de Historia, Bogota, 1980, 1787). For some examples o f contemporary histories that repeat
this kind of vocabulary, see: Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein. Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and
America in the M aking o f Early Modern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2000):
H ector R. Feliciano Ramos, El Contrabando ingles en el Caribe y el Golfo de Mexico, 1748-1778 (Sevilla,
1990); J.H. Elliott, Empires o f the A tlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 (Yale
U niversity Press, 2006); Lance Grahn, The Political Economy o f Smuggling: Regional Economies in Early
Bourbon New Granada (W estview Press, Oxford, 1997); and Colin Palmer, Human Cargoes: The British
Slave Trade to Spanish America, 1700-1739 (University o f Illinois Press, 1981).
9

not sufficiently explain the repulsion o f Vernon’s invasion or the daily violence
surrounding the contraband trade. (This article will argue that) The situation that Vernon
encountered on the ground in Cartagena reflected the fact that certain kinds of contraband
proved essential to the functioning of Spanish American economies and received the tacit
approval o f metropolitan officials. The War o f Jenkins’ Ear, although waged between
Britain and Spain over issues related to illicit trade, could not have been fought in
peripheral regions like Cartagena without those illegal supply chains. Further, emphasis
on the corrupting influence of contraband trade is too simplistic. Cartagena’s political
economy functioned in a vicious cycle: Jamaican interlopers supplied the Spanish guarda
costa vessels that perpetrated the violence against British shipping that brought the two
crowns to war, thereby increasing Cartagena’s demand for illicit goods. Contraband trade
was not peripheral to this world or, as one scholar describes smuggling, “outside both the
ideological and the pragmatic reach o f imperial officials.”7 The function of contraband
goods in the build-up to Vernon’s siege of Cartagena illuminates the internal logic of
smuggling that provided for the city’s protection while simultaneously creating the need
for more defense.
V ernon’s miscalculation o f the strength and flexibility o f Spain’s American
empire proved costly. Yet, focusing just on Vernon’s failure at Cartagena ignores his own
complicated relationship with smuggling. Following a tradition of illicit trade in the
British Royal Navy, Vernon carried contraband goods with as much ease as he carried
out official orders and, often, doing one required the other.8 Just as Vernon relied on

7 Cathy M atson, “Im perial Political Economy: An Ideological D ebate and Shifting Practices,” in William
and Mary Q uarterly, 3d ser., 69, no. 1 (Jan. 2012): 40.
s See: N.A.M. Rodger, The Com m and o f the Ocean: A Naval History o f Britain, 1649-1815 (W.W. Norton
& Com pany, New Y ork 2004):234-5.
3

smuggling to supply his crew for attacking Spanish territories, Spanish American
officials in Cartagena also made pragmatic choices in the face of constricted options.
Assigned the unenviable task of defending the port city from British commercial invasion
despite a lack of supplies from legal channels, port official Gabriel de Mendinueta
engaged in illicit trade in order to equip the naval vessels charged with harassing British
smugglers. Instead of contradicting Spain’s imperial goals, M endinueta and the guarda
costas served the global interests of metropolitan planners like Jose Patino. The choices
made by men like Vernon and M endinueta illuminate the tensions and desires in
Cartagena, Madrid, Kingston, and London that created the cycles of contraband and
violence that erupted into the War o f Jenkins’ Ear and continued long after.

Interpretations of Illicit Trade in the Caribbean
In imperial communications throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
British and Spanish colonial officials interpreted the rampant contraband trade carried on
in Spain’s American dominions as a sign o f locals’ greed. M any in the Spanish Empire
saw contraband trade as a structural problem that stemmed in large part from the
corruption of colonial authorities in American port cities. Two officials described the
“vicious illicit commerce,” around Cartagena as a “deeply embedded system,” that
flourished due to the “the misguided behavior o f those who govern,” who they saw as
“openly greedy and self-seeking at the expense o f others.”9 For others, the sheer size of
the problem made finding a solution seem insurmountable. According to a viceroy of
New Granada in the 1740s, the crown could not “completely castigate this pernicious
trade” without “five hundred thousand men to guard those coasts and to guard the guards
9 Ibid., p.242.
4

after them ,” who “succumb[ed] to bribery.” 10 General opinion seemed to discount the
idea that more soldiers could change the climate of corruption in Cartagena. Foreign
merchants were described as unloading goods “at whatever time o f the day or night, and
go through with them to the streets of this city” with total impunity.11 This description
matched the words of the British Rear Admiral Charles Stewart in 1731 when he wrote
17
that, “Villainy is inherent to this climate.” “ Antonio Julian, a priest who resided in New
Granada, foresaw the fatal weakening of the empire if steps were not taken to address the
smuggling trade. In Julian’s words “if the foreigners carry away the blood o f the New
Kingdom, it remains underfed and the Monarchy loses little by little its vigor and
substance.” 13 Imperial advisors also warned that contraband trade weakened the state’s
fiscal health because the goods consumed in the American colonies were of foreign
origin. According to a close minister of Philip V, “We have the most abundant markets
in the world without leaving the dominions of the King; but they serve us little, as twenty
percent o f what is consumed in the Indies is a product o f Spain.” 14 Spanish imperial
agents on both sides of the Atlantic spoke in unison when they disparaged the rampant
contraband trade with foreigners that occurred in the king’s American territories. And, in
each case, the loudest chorus of voices was reserved for vilifying the local officials who
allowed the trade to continue.

10 Gabriel Giraldo Jaramillo, Relaciones de M ando de los Virreyes de la Nueva Granada (Publicaciones del
Banco de la Republica, Bogota, Colom bia 1954): 42. (Translation is my own.)
11 Archivo General de Indias, Santa Fe 1233, Letter from Juan Pablo de Ibarra to the King, August 1727 translation is my own
12 Quoted in, N.A.M. Rodger, The Com m and o f the Ocean: A Naval History o f Britain, 1649-1815 (W.W.
Norton & Com pany, New York, NY 2004): 235.
13 Antonio Julian, S.J. La Perla de la America, Provincia de Santa M arta (Edicion facsim ilar) (Academia
Colom biana de Historia, Bogota, 1980), p.256. (Translation is my own.)
14 Jose del Campillo y Cossfo, Nuevo sistema de gobierno economic para la america (Universidad de los
Andes, M erida, Venezuela, 1971): 70.
5

Many observers outside of the Spanish empire saw the widespread illicit trade in
the American colonies as symptomatic o f Spain’s declining power, a decline that would
lead to Spain’s loss o f its American revenue. Even French imperial circles discussed the
apparent weakness o f Spain’s control over its American colonies, as when Michel-Jean
Amelot lamented that “The riches o f Peru and Mexico. . .are almost lost to Spain,” in a
correspondence with Louis X IV .15 The lawless character in the Americas seemed to
indicate to Amelot that Spain’s American subjects were on the verge o f violently shaking
off imperial rule. Amelot wrote that, “Avarice and pillage are unpunished, fortresses and
garrisons are neglected; all things seem to portend a fatal revolution.” 16 Spanish
Am erica’s apparent moral laxity with regard to the contraband trade played into the
pervasive myth o f Spain’s ailing imperial health by the eighteenth century.17 Throughout
official British correspondence and in newspapers bellicose rhetoric regarding Spanish
weakness was oft-repeated. Many pointed to the ease with which a war between the two
would tip in Britain’s favor, stating that, “If the Spaniards should bring us to the necessity
o f getting upon a W a r.. .it will be carry’d on with such Force and Vigour, as will soon
reduce them to Reason.” 18 The supposed prevalence of venal and corrupt officials in
Spanish America indicated to Spain’s rivals that the empire was little more than a house
of cards, ready to tumble with the slightest disturbance. Spain’s failure to supply its
colonies also added weight to the assumption outside of the Iberian Peninsula that
Spanish Americans would flock to a foreign banner if given the opportunity.
15 John Lynch, Bourbon Spain: 1700-1808 (Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass. 1989): 59.
16 Ibid., p. 59.
17 For a discussion o f this myth, see: Frank Jay M oreno, “The Spanish Colonial System: A Functional
A pproach,” Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 20, N. 2, (Jun. 1967), pp. 308-320; Alejandro Caneque, The
K in g ’s Living Image: The Culture and Politics o f Viceregal Power in Colonial M exico (Routledge, New
York, 2004); and Paul W. Mapp, The Elusive West and the Contest fo r Empire, 1713-1763 (Chapel Hill,
NC 2011).
18 Am erican Weekly Mercury\ A ugust 7, 1729, issue 500, p. 3.
6

While Spanish commentators seemingly condemned local officials and worried
about the future of their empire, their British counterparts praised the possibilities for
wealth generated by the contraband trade. The majority of British interlopers in the
Caribbean called Jamaica home, and their proximity to the Spanish Main provided a boon
to the island’s economy. As Jamaican resident Richard Harley explained, “ [t]he Trade
with the Spaniards from Jamaica (tho’ Collusive) has been very considerable,” and that
“there has been received from them in Gold and Silver and the Produce of New Spain,
200,000 /. or 250,000 /. Yearly.” 19 A more conservative estimate than Harley’s may have
been closer to the truth, such as that proposed by Jamaican Governor Nicholas Lawes,
who stated that “[t]he private trade use to bring into England between 2 and £3,000 a year
in ps. 8/8 silver, and gold.”20 Regardless of the figures, the island of Jamaica was an
important staging ground for the commercial invasion of Spanish America. According to
an early governor of Jamaica, possession of the island by the British effectively meant
that they would “become the masters of the mines of Mexico and Peru” by syphoning off
precious metals through contraband.21 In fact, by the mid-1730s, some in Parliament
thought that the contraband trade between Jamaica and the Spanish Main was so well
established that the trade’s legality might have been hazy to those on the ground. In one
debate, Sir William Yonge reasoned that Jamaicans “might be concerned in a contraband
trade in America, without themselves knowing that it was contraband.” For Yonge and
other members of Parliament, smuggling had become so common for British American
merchants that “many among them think they have as good a right to trade with the

19 Elizabeth Donnan, D ocum ents Illustrative o f the History o f the Slave Trade to Am erica (Carnegie
Institute of W ashington, 1931), p .151.
2()CSP, no. 272 (1717-18): 175.
21 G reat Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar o f State Papers, Colonial no. 97 (1696-1697): 179
(hereafter cited as CSP).
7

11

Spanish as with our own settlements.” “ For British observers, Spain seemed incapable of
a vigorous defense of its commercial interests in the Americas and British American
interlopers took advantage of that fact, aided in large measure by the participation of
local Spanish American officials.
Echoing the arguments of eighteenth-century Spanish imperial agents and their
British counterparts, much of the historiography of Caribbean smuggling assigns blame
to local Spanish American officials. In the words of one scholar, the port of Cartagena
“was a hotbed o f illegal activity.”^ The large-scale smuggling witnessed by eighteenthcentury observers depended on, as argued by another scholar, the “collaboration o f the
royal officials” in Spanish America who were “frequently denounced.. .for venality and
corruption.”24 Bribery serves as an explanation for some as to how so much contraband
moved through Spanish American ports. According to historian J.H. Elliott, colonial
officials like Mendinueta “would wink at this illicit trade once their palms had been
greased.”25 Despite the attention given to smuggling, however, contraband trade remains
seen as something carried on in the periphery and beyond the ability of imperial planners
to prevent or curtail.26 Overall, this picture of the political economy of smuggling points
to the easy illicit relationships carried on between subjects of different empires out of
sight of their metropolitan superiors. In this system, the vast expanse of the Atlantic
Ocean prevented imperial officials from reigning in their perfidious subjects who
22 A Collection o f the Parliam entary D ebates in England, fro m the year M ,D D ,LX VIII To the present time,
vol. 16 (London, 1735): 53.
23 Lance Grahn, The Political Econom y o f Smuggling: Regional Economies in Early Bourbon New
Granada (W estview Press, Oxford, 1997): 5.
"4 Colin Palmer, Human Cargoes: The British Slave Trade to Spanish America, 1700-1739 (University of
Illinois Press. 1981): 88.
"5 J. H. Elliott, Empires o f the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830 (Yale University
Press, New Haven, Conn., 2006): 224.
~6 Cathy M atson, “Imperial Political Economy: An Ideological Debate and Shifting Practices,” in William
and M ary Quarterly, 3d ser., 69, no. 1 (Jan. 2012): 40.

appeared to be more comfortable economic bedfellows with each other than with their
own merchants. In the dominant historiographic narrative, corruption as a result of
disloyalty served as the driving force in the Caribbean economy, resulting in the image of
a weak Spanish crown unable to control or protect its American possessions.
Corruption in eighteenth-century Spanish America, however, must be understood
in light of the proscriptive nature of Iberian law. In fact, in much of the early modem
world, law and practice did not match up, but such discrepancies were not indicative of
rampant corruption. As historian Frank Jay Moreno lucidly explains, Spanish law
frequently outlined humanistic and idealistic contours of proper behavior with the tacit
">7

understanding that such laws would, of necessity, be broken." Furthermore, the issue of
corruption becomes difficult to define in the Spanish American world, where the
structure and dissemination of authority depended on ties of patronage that connected the
king to his subjects across the ocean. As historian Alejandro Caneque argues, the Spanish
imperial system was one o f an “economy o f favor” in which agents o f the empire
routinely used client-patron incentives, like bribery, to cement allegiance to a distant
king.28 In this sense, corruption occurred only when agents of the Spanish king acted
against the king’s interests in pursuit of their own enrichment. It was, in fact, this
“network o f personal relations,” according to historian Zacarias Moutoukias, which
“served to make the administrative structure more flexible,” and capable o f assimilating
?9
political and economic challenges with a proscriptive and idealistic legal culture."

27 Frank Jay M oreno, “The Spanish Colonial System: A Functional Approach,” Western Political
Q uarterly, Vol.s 20, No. 2, Part 1 (Jun., 1967) pp. 308-320.
28 Alejandro Caneque, The K in g ’s Living Image: The Culture a n d Politics o f Viceregal Power in Colonial
M exico (Routledge: New York, 2004): 174.
29 Zacarias M outoukias, “Power, Corruption, and Commerce: The Making o f Local Administrative
Structure in Seventeenth-Century Buenos Aires,” H ispanic Am erican Historical R eview , Vol. 68, No. 4,
(Nov., 1988), pp. 771-801: 776.
9

“Corruption” in Spanish America, therefore, must be interpreted in accordance with
colonial reality on the ground rather than through British misinterpretations or the
proscriptive Spanish American legal culture.

The Case of Cartagena
Situated on the tropical lowlands of the Spanish Main, Cartagena de Indias
overlooked one of the most famed bays in the Americas. Named for the equally as
impressive harbor-city of Cartagena, Spain, Cartagena de Indias was constructed on a
sandy island engulfed to its north by a wide bay and hemmed in on the south by a narrow
slit of water. The bay of Cartagena was especially well-suited for harboring ships, as
Spanish naval officials described, it “extends two leagues and a half from north to south;
has a sufficient depth of water and good anchorage; and [is] so smooth, that the ships are
no more agitated than on a river.”30 Situated on the brim of the Spanish Caribbean and
within short sailing time to Porto Bello, Cartagena de Indias became the cornerstone of
Spain’s transatlantic trade with the southern territories of Peru. The Spanish galleons
dispatched for the trade fair at Porto Bello weighed anchor first at Cartagena and waited
to receive word that the treasure ships of Peru had reached Panama. Once the
announcement arrived that the silver-laden ships had landed, the Spanish galleons would
leave their anchorage at Cartagena and sail to Porto Bello to start off the annual trade fair.
At the conclusion of that fair, if everything went to imperial specifications, the fleet
31
would once again return to Cartagena before making the voyage back to Spain.' In this

,0 Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, A Voyage to South America (London, 1772): 26.
31 Museo N aval de M adrid, No. inventario: 5279, Signatura: 4388, “Proyecto Para Galeones, Y Flotas, de
el Peru, Y Nueva Espaha, Y Para Navios de Registro, Y Avisos Que Navegaron A Am bos R e v n o s Stein
and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, pp. 100-150.
10

imperial scheme Cartagena de Indias proved important not for what it contributed to the
trade fair but for the safe landing and refitting it provided the flota on both ends of its
voyage

Cartagena de Indias, AGI 1594
The sheer value of trade which anchored at Cartagena de Indias kept the port city
in the forefront o f Spain’s strategic calculations in the Caribbean. One scholar estimates
that during the middle decades of the eighteenth century, nearly 1,800,000 pesos of silver
a year arrived at the port of Cartagena before being sailed back to C adiz/

That silver

from the mines of Potosf and the interior supplied the Spanish crown with the bullion it

32

Lance Grahn. The Political Econom y o f Smuggling: Regional Economies in Early Bourbon New

Granada (W estview Press, Oxford, 1997), p. 18.
11

needed to advance its European objectives in a century of near constant warfare. The
successful seizure of the 1628 treasure fleet off the coast of Cuba by the Dutch privateer
Piet Heyn, a bounty worth roughly 4.8 million silver pesos, justified the Spanish crown’s
single-minded focus on the treasure fleet in the Caribbean.33 Possession of a port
described at the time as admitting “only one ship at a time, and even she must be obliged
to keep close to shore,” guaranteed that in at least one leg o f the silver’s transatlantic
voyage, metropolitan planners could be assured of its safety.34
The amount silver that passed through Cartagena de Indias each year inspired the
envy o f Spain’s imperial rivals. Cartagena suffered successful sacks by Francis Drake in
1586, Henry Morgan in 1668, and the French baron of Pointis, Bernard Louis Desjean in
1697.35 Foreign aggression against the city meant that by the mid-eighteenth century
providing for the city’s security became a major concern. According to official Spanish
sources, “ [t]he garrison in times of peace consisted] of ten companies of regulars, each
containing, officers included, 77 men; besides several companies of militia.”36 The
primary responsibility o f Cartagena’s imperial officials was to prevent the 1628 Cuban
disaster from reoccurring and guarantee safe anchorage to the galleon fleet. The territorial
toeholds gained by Spain’s rivals in the Caribbean were initially intended as staging
grounds for attacks on Spain’s lucrative trade with its American colonies. Surrounded by
aggressive rivals at Jamaica, Curasao, and Martinique, Cartagena central to the safe
passage of the galleon fleet.

33 Kris E. Lane, Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas: 1500-1750. (M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1998), pp.
69-71.
34 Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, A Voyage to South Am erica (London, 1772): 26.
35 Francisco Javier M embrillo Becerra, La Batalla de Cartagena de Indias (Publidisa, M adrid, Spain 2011):
24.
6 Juan and Ulloa, A Voyage to South A m erica, p. 23.
12

Despite being well-defended and strategically important, Cartagena de Indias
suffered along with the majority of Spanish America in the eighteenth-century from a
lack of legal Spanish trade goods, leaving residents with few legal options for acquiring
merchandise. As the president of the Audiencia de Santa Fe explained to the king, “the
pitiful situation,” in New Granada was that “the land has so many riches and abundance
[yet] where almost all o f the inhabitants and citizens are beggars.”37 Despite the
tremendous wealth that passed through the port of Cartagena, the region itself remained
trade-poor. Periods of time between flotas produced hardships for the residents and
soldiers alike in Cartagena. According to visiting officers of the Spanish navy, the lengths
of time without trade fairs “the inhabitants o f Cartagena call tiempo muerto, the dead
time; for, with regard to the trade carried on with the other governments [of the Spanish
empire], it is not worth notice.”38 Through the stifling heat of Caribbean summers or
entire years in which the flota never came, metropolitan planners expected local officials
to keep the port of Cartagena safe and clear but provided little by way of much-needed
supplies.
The economic strain of Cartagena, moreover, was not particular to the eighteenth
century. Even during the economic boom of the sixteenth century, Cartagena relied on
outside funds for the maintenance of its port and garrisons. The placer mining which
produced a flush of gold at Cartagena’s founding faltered in the later decades of the
seventeenth century. What little gold enslaved Africans coaxed out o f the region’s
tropical streambeds during the course of a century proved insufficient for the construction

37 Gabriel G iraldo Jaramillo, Relaciones de M ando de los Virreyes de la Nueva Granada (Publicaciones del
Banco de la Republica, Bogota, Colom bia 1954): 23. (Translation is my own.)
3H Juan and Ulloa, A Voyage to South Am erica, p. 83.
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and maintenance o f Cartagena’s military installations.39 Imperial planners used the
situado, or treasury funds, from wealthier areas of Spanish America in order to pay for
the defense of Cartagena’s port. Drawing the majority of its situado from Quito,
Cartagena scrapped together enough wealth, as reported by Spanish officials, “for
keeping up the fortifications, furnishing the artillery, and other expences, necessary for
the defence o f the place and its forts.”40 Spain diverted resources to the defense of
Cartagena due to the port’s strategic importance in the imperial trade system.
Despite the primacy o f the city’s port, Cartagena’s hinterlands proved incapable
of supporting the Tierra Firme fleets. Cartagena dealt with a very basic problem as a
tropical outpost - it was too hot to cultivate European staples. As one moves inland from
New Granada’s hot and humid coastline, increased elevation and decreased temperatures
yield to a landscape more favorable to wheat cultivation. Despite the relative proximity
between the port and the highland city of Santa Fe de Bogota, however, wheat cost 2,000
percent more in Cartagena than in the highlands where it was grown.41 The voyage from
the tierra fri'a in the spine of the Andes to the tropical lowlands took four arduous
months, during which time the wheat generally went bad if it arrived at all. Without a
reliable domestic supply or legal imports of wheat, officials in Cartagena relied on
foreign supplies. The proximity of Jamaica, moreover, plugged Cartagena into the
provisions trade circuits of British North America.42

Anthony M cFarlane. Colombia Before Independence: Economy, Society, and Politics Under Bourbon
Rule (Cam bridge University Press, 1993), p.8.
40 Juan and Ulloa, A Voyage to South A m erica, p. 84.
41 John R. Fisher, Allan J. Kuethe, and Anthony M cFarlane, eds. Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New
Granada and Peru (Baton Rouge, Louisiana 1990): 140.
42 Colin Palmer, Human Cargoes: The British Slave Trade to Spanish America, 1700-1739 (University of
Illinois Press, 1981), p.61.
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Commercial Invasion and the Guarda costas
At the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession, Britain gained the
exclusive right to carry slaves to Spain’s American colonies, known as the asiento
contract. Starting in 1713, Queen Anne granted the privilege of conducting that trade to
the newly formed South Sea Company. The island of Jamaica, positioned in the center of
the Spanish Caribbean, was a suitable choice as a refreshment station for the South Sea
Company’s trans-Atlantic slaving vessels. Initially both Barbados and Jamaica were used,
by the mid-1720s, Jamaica eclipsed Barbados in importance due to the resources of the
island and the volume of trade carried on there.43 The abundance of cattle and produce in
the early decades of the eighteenth century, before more land on the island was dedicated
to the production of sugar, meant that the factories there were well-stocked.44 South Sea
Company agents recuperated and quarantined the enslaved Africans at Kingston after the
horrors of the Middle Passage in an attempt to make them appear healthy before being
shipped to their final destinations for sale.
Jamaica’s location appealed to more than just legal representatives of the South
Sea Company and the convergence of trade goods intended for Spanish America on the
island provided ample opportunity for smugglers. Private smugglers and Company ships
encountered stiff competition for Spanish American trade among Britain’s Royal Navy.
Upon taking his post as governor, Nicholas Lawes was appalled by the conduct of the
Royal Navy stationed at Jamaica. Despite the nearly constant dangers of piracy and

43 Ibid., p.59.
44 Factories, in this sense, refer to the outposts established throughout the Atlantic W orld by slave trading
com panies where slaves were housed and fed after the M iddle Passage and before their sale. The merchants
who resided in these posts were referred to as factors and will be referred to as such.
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harassment by Spanish privateers, Lawes found the British ships assigned to the island
absent. The very Navy vessels upon which Jamaicans depended for their security, the
Winchelsea, the Ludlow Castle, and the Diamond, had sailed down to the Spanish Main
days before, laden with contraband goods. Lawes’ rude awakening to the operations of
the British Royal Navy in the Caribbean would not be the last of his short tenure, nor
would the N avy’s dedication to smuggling ebb in the coming years.45 The participation of
the Royal Navy in trade that Spanish imperial agents considered illicit indicates an
organized and aggressive commercial pressure on the part of the British. This pressure is
not adequately described by terms like “interloper” and “smuggler,” which denote a
small-scale illegality rather than an institutionalized attempt to break open Spanish
American ports on the part of the British Navy. The Royal N avy’s engagement in the
contraband trade also escalated opportunities for violence between the two crowns in the
waters of the Caribbean.
Spanish imperial planners confronted this veritable commercial invasion of the
crown’s American possessions without a strong naval presence o f their own. As a result,
Spain issued corsair patents to captains willing to defend Spanish American waters by
searching and seizing smuggling vessels. Stemming from precedent set in the seventeenth
century, Spain awarded successful seizures with a portion of the prize money to be
adjudicated in local courts.46 Commercial incentives on both sides created flashpoints of
violence across the Caribbean as guarda costas and British merchantmen encountered
one another on the high seas. Most of these meetings met with “the usual Compliments of

45 G reat Britain, Public Records Office, Calendar o f State Papers, Colonial (1717-1718): 271 (hereafter
cited as CSP).
46 Luis Navarro Garcia, Historia General de Espana y America: Tomo XI-1, Segunda Edicion (Ediciones
Rialp, S.A., M adrid, Spain 1981 ):34.
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hanging, burning M atches between their Fingers, &c.”47 Spanish privateers were accused
in the British American press of excessive violence, such as when a Boston merchant
sloop was taken and, “in cold blood [they] cut the Master and all his Men to pieces,
saving only the Cabbin-Boy.”48 The spread of guarda costas throughout Spanish
American ports turned British contraband trading into a dangerous venture while the
increased presence of ships of the British Royal Navy raised the stakes for Spanish
privateers as well.
In this environment o f simmering conflict, a British sloop weighed anchor in the
bay of Cartagena de Indias in February of 1729. The sloop had sailed south from
Jamaica, choosing to land at the well-fortified port instead of any other point along the
1,500 leagues of relatively undefended coastline running from Caracas to Lima.49 The
British vessel would have passed through the channel of Boca Chica, that straight so
narrow that only one ship could sail through at a time. On the vessels’ left stood the fort
of San Luis de Boca Chica, a fortification at the far end of Tierra Bomba, whose cannons
sat poised for action as the Jamaican vessel sailed past.50 Once at the port, the Jamaican
interloper unloaded two hundred barrels of flour in clear view of M endinueta and other
port officials.51 As with so many cases of foreign merchants unloading cargo in Spanish
American port cities, this Jamaican interloper presumably paid a handsome bribe and
profited from M endinueta’s venality.

47 South Carolina G azette, January 29, 1731-2, no. 4.
4X The Boston N ew s-Letter, M arch 5, 1730, issue 166, p. 2.
49 Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa. D iscourse and Political Reflections on the Kingdoms o f Peru
(University o f O klahom a Press, 1978), p.241.
^ For a description o f the fortifications o f Cartagena, see: Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, A Voyage to
South Am erica (London, 1772): pp. 26-30.
51 Archivo General de Indias, Santa Fe 1093, Don Gabriel de M endinueta, Puerto de Cartagena 16 de
febrero, 1729.
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And yet, M endinueta addressed a letter to Phillip V in order to explain the
entrance o f the Jam aican’s contraband flour. While he remains silent as to whether or not
his “palms were greased,” he makes clear that the barrels were intended for the Spanish
American seamen who would risk their lives seeking out prizes and defending the
crown’s commercial interests in the circum-Caribbean. Perhaps M endineuta’s letter
serves as a cover, artifice for his own involvement in a lucrative smuggling ring which
supplied the residents of Cartagena rather than its hard-working naval crews. Such an
accusation may be true and, as is common when observing illegal activity from a remove
o f several centuries, completely unverifiable. M endinueta’s own promotion to captain of
New Granada’s guarda costa squadron that same year indicates that at least someone
considered his performance as port official commendable.52 Further, at no point were the
guarda costas themselves a mere artifice for illegal activity, as more and more cases of
violent maritime encounters in the Caribbean make clear.
The case of Mendinueta illustrates the countervailing pressures encountered by
subjects of the Spanish crown in the Caribbean and the pragmatism required to deal with
those pressures. While letters o f patent for corsairs alleviated Spain’s pressing need for
increased naval strength for a time, Spanish American corsairs in ports like Cartagena
still required foodstuffs and naval stores to operate. In the near-century between the
1670s and the 1760s only ten galleon fleets passed through the port of Cartagena —six
between 1675 and 170053 and four between 1713 until 1763.54 Many of the intended
voyages were prevented from embarking from Sevilla, and later Cadiz, due to the almost
52 Grahn, The Political Econom y o f Sm uggling, p. 156.
53 A nthony McFarlane. Colombia Before Independence: Economy, Society, and Politics Under Bourbon
Rule (Cam bridge University Press, 1993), p.22.
34 Lance Grahn. The Political Econom y o f Smuggling: Regional Economies in Early Bourbon New
Granada (W estview Press, Oxford, 1997), p.20.
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continuous state of war on the continent and in the sea lanes of the Caribbean. Still others
were waylaid in Spanish American ports, unable to sell their merchandise due to the
prevalence of contraband goods which flooded the otherwise empty markets. As a result
port officials like Mendinueta used illicit trade in order to equip guarda costas.55 The
presence of armed Royal Navy ships near Spanish American ports meant that the safety
of the port depended on equipping Spanish American corsairs through any means
necessary.
The calculation of supplying the guarda costas over prosecuting the contraband
trade proved as much economic as it was strategic. Contraband trade may have
challenged Spain’s claim to monopoly privileges over its American possessions, but such
challenges mattered little when compared to the wealth brought into Spain through the
galleon fleet. While Jamaican observers estimated the contraband trade with the Spanish
Main yielded between £200,000 to £250,000 a year, the Spanish crown remained
concerned with the much larger sums of Peruvian silver brought to the Iberian Peninsula
each year.56 Assuming a consistent value of £196,000 as the value of Spanish American
goods earned through illicit trade and multiplying that value by the thirty year period in
which Britain held the asiento contract, Britain earned roughly 5.9 million pounds.57 On
the other hand, even estimating that the galleon fleet only completed a successful voyage
eight times in the same period with an average of 1,800,000 pesos onboard, Spain earned

55 N or was M endinueta’s case extraordinary in Spanish America, as historian Zacarias M outoukias’ work
on the role o f illicit trade in the supplying o f Buenos A ires’ garrisons w ith monetary loans and supplies in
the seventeenth-century makes clear. According to M outoukias, in a com m ent that applies equally as well
to Cartagena, “corruption was bom out o f the conditions in w hich the system was erected,” in, M outoukias,
“Power, Corruption, and Com m erce,” p. 799.
36 Elizabeth Donnan, D ocum ents Illustrative o f the History o f the Slave Trade to Am erica (Carnegie
Institute of W ashington, 1931), p. 151.
37 For the £196.000 value for 1715, see: Curtis P. Nettels, The M oney Supply o f the American Colonies
before 1720 (Clifton, New Jersey 1973): 40.
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roughly 14.4 million pesos through its transatlantic trade.

While the erratic arrival of

the galleons to Cartagena during the eighteenth century proved insufficient to supply the
port city, the value of those return shipments of silver far outweighed the value of the
contraband trade. From the perspective of Spain’s imperial economy, therefore,
M endinueta’s primary responsibility lay with protecting the galleons rather than limiting
foreign imports.
Furthermore, M endinueta could not bar entrance to some foreign interlopers while
admitting only those needed to supply the garrison and the guarda costas. According to
Spanish naval officials, if Mendinueta chose to selectively prosecute some interlopers,
then, “no other ship would enter their port.”59 While these same officials assumed that the
lack of ships entering the port would upset local officials because it would mean the loss
of their source of illicit income, perhaps there is a less cynical way of interpreting the
apparent lack of action against foreign interlopers at Cartagena. If confiscation of one
foreign vessel would frighten the others away from the port, Mendinueta would sacrifice
his ability to provide for Cartagena’s coast guard defense by vigorously prosecuting the
contraband trade. The loss of foreign trade would have left the garrisons of Cartagena
without a sufficient supply o f basic staples, further jeopardizing M endinueta’s ability to
defend the port. Within the framework of the larger Spanish political economy, the
seizure of foreign vessels at the port of Cartagena would have caused more harm than
benefit.60
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Granada (W estview Press, Oxford, 1997), p. 18.
39 Juan and Ulloa, Discourse and Political Reflections, p. 50.
60 The role o f contraband trade and its persecution on the ground in Cartagena affords another promising
route of inquiry not taken in the current study. W hile personal profit motivated merchants to outfit guarda
costas and com petition between different political factions in Cartagena played a role in harassing British
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While the value of the fleets which passed through Cartagena proved exceptional,
Mendinueta was not the only Spanish American officials who used illicit supply chains to
defend Spanish possessions. According to historian Joyce Elizabeth Harmon, Manuel de
Montiano, the governor of Florida, faced similar circumstances in the year before the
outbreak o f the W ar o f Jenkins’ Ear. In a letter sent to the governor o f Cuba, Juan
Francisco de Giiemes y Horcasitas, Montiano explained his own engagement in
contraband trade with British North America. According to Montiano, a shipment of New
York flour arrived at St. Augustine because he worried that the impending conflict and
the increased violence in the waters of the Caribbean would cut off his peripheral port.61
For that reason, Montiano engaged the easiest supply chain available to him. Giiemes y
Horcasitas approved o f M ontiano’s decision, which is telling considering the Cuban
governor’s zealous support o f the guarda costas on his own island. One of the guarda
costas sponsored by Giiemes y Horcasitas, the Triunfo captained by Domingo Lopez de
Aviles, captured ten British vessels in the year 1737 with the spirited support of the
governor.62 Forced into situations in which the best defense o f Spain’s American
territories meant engaging in foreign commerce, both Giiemes y Horcasitas and Montiano
acted in similar ways to Mendinueta.

shipping, this study focuses on contraband trade from the m etropolitan perspective. For works that
approach contraband trade through an analysis of the social stratification, m erchant com petition, and
political factions, see: Cromwell, Jesse Levis. “Covert Commerce: A Social History o f Contraband Trade in
Venezuela, 1701-1789.” PhD diss., U niversity o f Texas at Austin, 2012; Prado, Fabricio Pereira, “Colonia
do Sacramento: a situayo na fronteira platina no seculo X V III,” Horizontes Antropologicos, Vol. 9, 1
(2003): 79-104; and M outoukias, Zacarias, “Power, Corruption, and Commerce: The M aking o f the Local
A dministrative Structure in Seventeenth-Century Buenos A ires,” H ispanic Am erican Historical R eview,
Vol. 68, No. 4, (Nov., 1988): 771-801.
61 Joyce Elizabeth Harmon, Trade and Privateering in Spanish Florida: 1732-1763 (The St. Augustine
Historical Society, St. Augustine, Florida, 1969): 21.
62 Levi M arrero, Cuba: Economfa y Sociedad: del m onopolio hacia la libertad com m ercial (1701 -1763)(I)
(Editorial Playor, M adrid, Espana 1978): 81.
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In the cases of Giiemes y Horcasitas, Montiano, and Mendinueta, engagement in
or support of the contraband trade did not imply disloyalty but, rather, pragmatism. The
ability of imperial agents to disregard elements of Spanish law, moreover, was legally
institutionalized through appealing to the king. Each of these colonial agents invoked the
logic of Spanish imperial law that the king, as the ultimate arbiter of justice, would
approve of their actions if he were aware of the situation on the ground.63 While
Mendinueta refrained from detailing his dependence on contraband trade to the king, he
made clear that Cartagena lacked fundamental supplies that the British could provide.
M endinueta appealed to King Philip V that without the importation of Jamaican flour
“we find it impossible to Continue in Cruising because the Royal Officials [in Cartagena]
said there are absolutely no supplies to meet [a maritime force’s] most basic Needs.”64 In
1731, moreover, Governor Antonio de Salas hinted at the longstanding supply chains
running from Jamaica to Cartagena in a testimony to the crown. According to Salas, “a
packetboat named Sara, her captain John Paris arrived from Jamaica carrying Goods and
supplies for the Ships o f the Guardacostas.” Salas testified that the arrival o f goods from
Jamaica under the commission of one Domingo Justiniani, resident of that island, was
quite frequent.65 Taking Salas’s testimony, it is clear that M endineuta’s lack o f supplies
was met by the regular arrival of contraband goods from Jamaica. Illicit supply chains
provided M endinueta with the means necessary to accomplish his primary responsibility
- provide for the guarda costas and Cartagena’s defense.

63 For a discussion o f the legal concept o f “se acata pero no se cumple,” or “I obey but do not com ply,” see:
M oreno, “The Spanish Colonial System: A Functional Approach,” p. 317-8.
64 Archivo General de Indias, Santa Fe 1093, Don Gabriel de M endinueta, Puerto de Cartagena 16 de
febrero. 1729.
63 Archivo General de Indias, Indiferente General 2809, Testimonio de Cartagena, 18 de diciem bre, 1731.
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The International Role of the Guarda Costas
M endinueta took his post in Cartagena during the tumultuous early decades of the
eighteenth century as warfare ended in Europe and a new Spanish dynasty was crowned.
The W ar of Spanish Succession gave Madrid the unprecedented opportunity to centralize
authority over the country’s semi-autonomous provinces. Further, inheriting the
reforming impulses of the reign of Charles II, the new Bourbon monarchy sat poised for
greater control over and reform of the Indies trade. Yet, the new king suffered from his
own paralyzing personal demons and became dependent on the strong-wili and force of
character of his second wife, Elizabeth Famese.66 While Famese brought bright and able
ministers into the highest echelons o f Spain’s government, her single-minded focus on
obtaining Italian principalities for her sons hamstrung many initiatives that her ministers
considered more important to Spain’s imperial health.67 One of the highly competent
ministers who Famese brought to Spanish government, Jose Patino, took a special
interest in foreign trade and Spanish American governance.
Patino showed a keen interest in the defense o f Spain’s trade with the American
colonies. He rose in the ranks of Spanish bureaucracy partially through his connections
with the abbe Alberoni, an association which indebted him greatly to A lberoni’s patron,
Elizabeth Fam ese.68 While not a reformer in the sense of the later Bourbon ministers,
Patino instinctively recognized the need for Spain to exert a strong naval presence,
especially in the face of British commercial aggressions in the Americas.69 Patino
understood the abuses perpetrated by British merchants, insight he gained when he sent
66 For two lively accounts o f Philip V ’s em otional and mental issues, see: John D. Bergamini, The Spanish
Bourbons: The H istory o f a Tenacious Dynasty (New York: Putnam, 1974); and Carlos M artinez Shaw and
M arina Alfonso Mola, Felipe V (Madrid: A rlanza Ediciones, 2001).
67 See: John Lynch, Bourbon Spain: 1700-1808 (Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass. 1989): pp. 80-95.
John Lynch, Bourbon Spain: 1700-1808 (Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass. 1989): 84.
69 Stein and Stein, Silver, Trade, and War, p. 203.
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the naval officers with the French scientific expedition of La Condamine to report back to
him on the state of the Indies.70 Patino also understood Spain’s relatively weak
bargaining position coming out of a war with no significant naval power. The
administrative rise of Patino worried some British observers. British ambassador
Benjamin Keene lamented, “No one can be more certain than I am, that [Patino] is an
enemy to all foreign commerce, and as he had more knowledge of trade and of the abuses
in the customs than any minister had before him, he will make us more uneasy than any
has yet done.”71 Fam ese’s patronage o f Patino, however, forced the minister to reorient
his American designs around her Italian concerns, leading to a creative exploitation of
American maritime violence for Spanish imperial gain in Italy.
In the decades following the W ar of the Spanish Succession, Spain had neither the
finances nor political will for another continent-wide conflict, despite Fam ese’s
aggressive posturing towards the Italian principalities of Tuscany and Parma. By
deploying what one scholar has described as “the diplomacy o f menace,” Patino coaxed
Britain into the Treaty o f Seville in which Britain promised to support Spain’s
aggressions in Tuscany and Parma by promising to reign in the guarda costas J 2 The
threat of guarda costa violence played into Patino’s diplomatic arsenal because o f the
asiento contract.73 The lucrative trade contract meant that Patino could push his British
counterparts further because a declaration of war would prove costly to Britain. The
threat of financial loss allowed Patino to issue empty decrees in response to British
70 Ibid., p. 203.
71 Keene to W alpole, November 25, 1731 quoted in Lynch, Bourbon Spain, p. 146.
72 Lynch, Bourbon Spain, p. 136.
73 The asiento contract was the right to trade a specified num ber of slaves to Spanish America. The need for
the contract began with the Treaty o f Tordesillas in 1492 which divided the known world between Spain
and Portugal, separating Spain from access to the African coast. From that m oment forward, the Spanish
em pire depended on foreign importers to bring African slave labor to its colonies across the Atlantic.
Britain received the contract as a concession following the W ar of the Spanish Succession.
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outrage without enacting concrete plans to curb the violent depredations of the guarda
costas. In one such decree from 1732, “Governors are to understand, that they shall be
answerable for the Violences which the said Cruizers shall commit.”74 In order to prevent
violence and the seizure o f unlawful prizes, the decree further recommended that, “before
[governors] give them Commission to go to Sea, they ought to examine into the
Characters o f their Persons.”75 Yet, even Patino’s negotiating counterpart, Benjamin
Keene, recognized that placing blame on Spanish American governors for guarda costas
seizing unlawful prizes simply added to “la lenteur Espagnole,” with little restitution for
British American seamen. Beyond adding delays to the process of adjudicating on prizes,
Keene recognized “a share o f malice” in Patino’s maneuvering, knowing that his wellworn sentiments of outrage at the utter lawlessness of the guarda costas belied little
attempt to remedy that maritime violence.76
Spain’s relative lack o f naval power going into the eighteenth century meant that
the success o f Patino’s policy also depended on the illicit trade.77 As the Daily Courant
reported in 1726, “Don Joseph Patino is very busy in finding out Ways and Means for
raising M oney for the present Emergencies.” While the minister recognized the need for a
more vigorous policing o f Spain’s American trade, he offered, “a high Interest to the
monied Men here to advance Money; but the Securities for Repayment being precarious,
and M oney very scarce, his Propositions meet with many Difficulties.” Patino’s fiscal
difficulties were further complicated by the demands of the Intendant of Marine, who
needed, “Sixty six thousand Pieces o f Eight from the Commerce there, for defraying . ..

74 Am erican Weekly M ercury, April 20, 1732, issue 643, p. 3.
73 Am erican Weekly M ercury, April 20, 1732, issue 643, p. 3.
16 Keene to W alpole, November 25, 1731 quoted in Lynch, Bourbon Spain, p. 146.
77 Henry Kamen, Spain, 1469-1714: A Society o f Conflict (Harlow, United Kingdom, 2005): 274.
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the Charge of two Men of War, which are to go to cruise against the Interlopers upon the
Coast o f Cartagena.”78 While the cost o f two Men o f War strapped Spain’s already
precarious budget, Patino would have understood the benefits of allowing privateers to
patrol American waters. Avarice drove Spanish American seamen in pursuit of wealthy
British prizes, relieving the state of the heavy burden of providing maritime defense.
With his knowledge of trade in the Indies, including the illegal aspects of it, Patino would
have recognized that many of the naval stores and supplies which the guarda costas
needed would arrive through illicit channels.79 Patino’s success, therefore, rested on his
ability to use the contraband trade as an instrument of empire. By tapping into British
trade networks for supplies, in many ways men like Mendinueta were accomplishing
exactly what Patino wanted. Illegal from the point of view of the Spanish, these trade
networks were nonetheless used as supply chains for the nascent Spanish naval presence
in the Caribbean.
Despite the rag-tag nature of the Spanish guarda costas fleet, they proved
remarkably successful at harassing British American shipping. Although their official
mandate remained to protect Spain’s American possessions from illicit traders, their
actions belied the larger purpose set out for them by Patino. British governors throughout
the Americas lodged complaints similar to that of Governor Archibald Hamilton of
Jamaica who wrote the Council of Trade and Plantations that guarda costas robbed
British subjects with impunity throughout the Caribbean. According to Hamilton, many

78 Daily Courant (London, England), Thursday, O ctober 27, 1726; Issue 7810, page 2. The “Em ergency”
which Patino faced in 1726, specifically involved the blockading o f Cartagena by V ice-Adm iral Francis
Hosier as a result o f anger over guarda costa seizures. See: Nowell, Charles E. “The Defense o f
Cartagena,” The Hispanic Am erican H istorical Review, Vol. 42, No. 4, 1962.
19 Juan and Ulloa, Discourse, pp. 45-50; Archivo General de Indias, Santa Fe 374, Letter from Jose Patino
to the King, April 14, 1722.
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British ships were seized “for which no other pretence, has in some cases been found,
then that some few Spanish pistolls or inconsiderable sums o f coin’d silver . . . has been
found on board.” Worse still were the cases in which British vessels were seized and held
under the mere suspicion of illegal trade.80 While claiming that seized British vessels
were innocent of engaging in contraband trade may have served as cover for those
vessels’ restitution, from the perspective of the Spanish political economy, such claims
mattered little. If Patino wished to use the actions of the guarda costas to pressure Britain
into supporting his patron’s Italian designs, then the ships proved more effective to him
the more outrage they incurred among British merchants. Patino’s promises to curtail the
cruising of guarda costas in American waters functioned to bring British officials to the
negotiating table.
Much ink was spilled in the British American press regarding the violence
perpetrated by the guarda costas throughout American waters. Readers of these
newspapers encountered many examples of stories such as that which ran in Philadelphia
on July 14, 1720. According to the article “ 18 Dead Bodies, appearing to be English
Men, were found, drove on Shore,” off the coast o f Virginia. The paper reported the
bodies to be the victims of a guarda costa commissioned out of St. Augustine. As if the
shock of eighteen dead were not enough, the story went on to detail how the victims were
“tied back to back,” with one gentleman “found with his hands tied behind him, and his
o 1

two great toes tied together.”

Ostensibly, the victims were tied up in order to ensure

their drowning when thrown into the Atlantic. W hether or not the unfortunate British
subjects encountered a guarda costa or any number of stateless Caribbean pirates remains

XWCSP, 1716 p.203.
Xl Am erican Weekly Mercury’, July 14, 1720, issue 30, p. 2.
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as inconclusive now as it would have been in 1720. The newspaper article does, however,
demonstrate the kinds of violence which the British considered the guarda costas capable
of committing.
While the guarda costas were blamed for some maritime violence with scant
evidence, many more cases of bloodshed fell squarely on their shoulders. In 1731, for
example, a British Royal Navy vessel, the Spence, “had taken a Spanish Guard la Costa;
and on board her found an Englishman newly murdered.”82 In another encounter between
the British Navy and the guarda costas, Captain Berkeley of the Windsor came across an
English master and two other men in a canoe off the coast of Hispaniola. According to
the English master, his vessel was seized by a guarda costa who kidnapped the three men
in order to use them as pilots on a privateering cruise up the North American coast. The
master claimed that the Spanish seamen of the guarda costa treated the rest of his crew
with, “cruelties,” such as, “cutting o ff noses and arms in cold blood and wantonness.”

83

While it remains doubtful that Patino ordered Spanish American officials to condone
such bloodshed, the Spanish administration under his watch accomplished little by way
of preventing it. The hysteria caused by such tales fed the pressure Patino needed to place
on his British counterparts.

The Royal Navy and the Commercial Proxy War
The violence perpetrated by the guarda costas of Cartagena played well in
Patino’s “diplomacy o f menace,” yet they were also responding to the threatening

82 South Carolina G azette, M arch 11, 1731, no. 10; Harmon, Trade and Privateering in Spanish F lorida, p.
7.
83 Vernon to Duke o f Newcastle and Sir Charles W ager (Draft) [Burford, at Port Royal, August 30, 1740]
in Ranft, The Vernon Papers, p. 125.
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presence of the British Royal Navy.

OA

A change in British policy in the early decades of

the eighteenth century meant that, in many ways, Spanish America went from being
under economic invasion to being in very real danger of an actual British siege. As
Jamaican Governor Lawes realized in the first days of his tenure in office, interlopers
were not the only British vessels plying contraband goods throughout Spanish America.
The British Royal Navy entered into the illicit trade throughout the early decades of the
eighteenth century, thereby actively pushing for the free trade, blue-water empire that
their Whig party backers in London so desperately w anted.85 The image of seventy and
eighty-gun navy vessels approaching Spanish American port cities to force trade
complicates the usual narrative of easy trans-imperial economic relations on the
periphery of empire.86 The threatening presence of the British Royal Navy in the waters
around Cartagena gave heightened importance to the guarda costas as maritime
defenders of Spanish American port cities.
Considering the threat of war and the loss of the asiento contract, the participation
of the British Royal Navy in illicit trade must be understood within Britain’s larger
political economy stretching back to the seventeenth century. In much the same way that
the War o f the Spanish Succession centralized M adrid’s authority over its hinterlands,
England was also reshaped by its own republican experiment. Described by one scholar
as, “an unqualified failure,” the reign o f Oliver Cromwell proved a boon to the fortunes
of England as a maritime power and permanently altered the balance of power in the
X4 Lynch, Bourbon Spain, p. 136.
H5 For a more detailed discussion o f this debate, see: Steve Pincus, “Rethinking M ercantilism: Political
Econom y, the British Empire, and the Atlantic W orld in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in
William and M ary Quarterly, 3d ser., 69, no. 1 (Jan. 2012): 3-34.
In much o f the historiography, frequency of smuggling and illicit trade is conflated with ease of
conducting illicit transactions —a point which the violence surrounding illicit trade around Cartagena
should complicate. For exam ples, see: Cathy M atson, “Imperial Political Economy: An Ideological Debate
and Shifting Practices,” in William and M ary Quarterly, 3d ser., 69, no. 1 (Jan. 2012), esp. footnote 12.
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Caribbean.87 In a political era epitomized by fear and aggression, naval strength became
a psychological and strategic panacea for England during the middle decades of the
seventeenth century.88 While building up forces on the island for protection against
enemies, real and imagined, Cromwell developed an aggressive plan to developed
footholds in the Spanish Caribbean from which to harass his Catholic foes. Cromwell
expected his planned invasion of Jamaica to continue in the Elizabethan legacy of war
‘beyond the line’ but his overtly aggressive policy destroyed amicable relations in the
eyes of the Spanish. This hostility set the stage for eighteenth-century conflicts where
belligerence in the Americas translated to widespread warfare on the European
mainland.89 Cromwell’s fall eased relations between Spain and Britain but possession of
Jamaica and a tradition of aggressive naval actions in the Americas remained a longlasting legacy of the period.
While the return of the monarchy in Britain offered Spanish America a reprieve
from the kinds of bellicose actions of the Cromwell regime, British planners still sought
access to Spanish A merica’s wealthy resources. The eighteenth century became the era of
contraband trade in the Americas as British merchants endeavored to more completely
break through Spain’s trade monopoly. Yet, British politicians were divided over how
best to tap into Spanish American trade wealth, a division which crossed the Atlantic and
complicated relations between Britain and Spain over issues of trade. On the one hand,
Tory planners developed the South Sea Company as the trading entity responsible for
carrying out Britain’s asiento contract with Spanish America, thereby seeking access to

87 N.A.M. Rodger, The Com m and o f the Ocean: A Naval History o f Britain, 1649-1815 (W.W. Norton &
Com pany, New York, NY 2004): 32.
88 Ibid., p. 32.
89A.P. Newton, The European Nations in the West Indies 1493-1688. (Adam & Charles Black, London,
1933), p. 213.
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trade through monopolizing the treaty concessions that Britain obtained through the War
of the Spanish Succession.90 On the other hand, Whigs sought to “pry open Spanish
American markets for British manufactures.”91 Jamaican interlopers carried out free-trade
with Spanish America with the tacit approval of the Whigs, while agents for the South
Sea Company railed against the competition with the Company’s monopoly privileges.
Added to this milieu, the British Royal Navy, largely supported in Parliament by Whigs,
aggressively defended Britain’s trade with Spanish America - both licit and illicit.92
The issue of armed British vessels weighing anchor at Spanish American ports
brought to the fore questions of imperial dominance and the very security o f Spain’s
American possessions in ways that Jamaican interlopers never had. While the 1729
Treaty of Seville proved a diplomatic success for Patino in gaining British support for the
seizures of Tuscany and Parma, part of the treaty betrayed the heart of Spanish fears
regarding armed British navy ships engaging in trade in the Americas. According to the
treaty, Britain agreed to “prohibit and effectively bar under any pretext ships o f war o f his
British Majesty from sheltering, escorting, or protecting the embarkations that commit
illicit commerce on the coasts o f the dominions o f his Catholic Majesty.”

Yet, just as

Patino used the threat of guarda costa violence for diplomatic gain despite promises
made in the Treaty of Seville, the participation of the British Royal Navy in contraband
trade supported the political will of the Whigs in Parliament despite their own promises
to terminate the trade. For the Spanish, the British policy of forcing open trade in Spanish
America with ships of the line as a wedge struck a deeper chord than the arrival of illicit
)0 For a more detailed discussion o f T ory’s role in the form ation o f the South Sea Company, see, Pincus,
“Rethinking M ercantilism .”
91 Pincus, “Rethinking M ercantilism ,” p. 27.
92 See, Rodger, The Command o f the Ocean, pp. 178-185.
93 El Tratado de Sevilla (1729) quoted in M arrero, Cuba: Economfa y Sociedad, p. 81. Translation is my
own.
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bolts of Brittany linen or barrels of North American wheat. For Patino and Spanish
American officials such as Mendinueta, the British Royal Navy turned the tables in the
proxy war waging in the Caribbean.
The Royal N avy’s primary responsibility in American waters was to restore
Britain’s maritime prestige which had suffered by the seizures o f British vessels by the
guarda costas. For an empire which prided itself on the extent of its trade and naval
power, Patino’s policy hurt the British where it counted the most by curtailing their
freedom of navigation. According to an editorial in the London Magazine and reprinted
throughout North America, “it is impossible that the British Commerce can be safe in any
Part of the W orld where it can be interrupted by a Spanish Cruiser, or Guarda Costa,”
because, as the commentator noted, the Spanish, “seize every English Ship they can make
themselves Masters of.”94 The danger of guarda costa attack, moreover, extended beyond
the British Em pire’s merchant vessels. In one case o ff the coast o f Cuba, the sloop
Hannah and Lydia, captained by Edward Sunderland, was seized by a Puerto Rican
guarda costa. Beyond taking the vessel and its valuables, the passengers aboard the sloop
were reportedly beaten and abused at the hands of their Spanish captors.95 British subjects
expressed their outrage at their curtailed liberties as some members of Parliament agitated
for war.
Before the outbreak of the War of Jenkins’ Ear, however, both the Whigs and the
British Navy faced constraints with how far they could push back on the Spanish
empire.96 The diplomatic maneuvers that allowed Patino to promise to reign in the

94 South Carolina G azette, Thursday, June 22, 1738, no. 230.
95 South Carolina G azette, Septem ber 23, 1732, no. 36.
)h See, Colin Palmer, Human Cargoes: The British Slave Trade to Spanish America, 1700-1739 (University
of Illinois Press, 1981).
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guarda costas while simultaneously encouraging their actions paralleled the efforts of the
British to maintain peace at the very edge of war. While the South Sea Company still
held the asiento contract, and the British public remained heavily invested in the
Company’s stock, outright w ar proved impracticable. Within such limitations, however,
the British Royal Navy carved a niche in the smuggling trade to Spanish America by
using force or the threat thereof for economic gain. For British imperial planners, the role
of the Navy supported their commercial interests in the Americas. For Jamaican officials,
however, the N avy’s extracurricular activities in the Caribbean left the port and the
island’s merchants open to pirate and guarda costa attacks.
Perhaps just as prejudicial to Jamaica, however, was the competition offered by
the Royal N avy to the island’s lucrative interloping trade. According to Governor Lord
A. Hamilton, Jamaican merchants as early as 1712, “Complain of the discouragement of
their trade, particularly of the most considerable and advantageous branch of it, that to the
Spanish coast, through Commanders of H.M. ships of war having in great measure
engrost it and carrying it on with the Queen’s ships.” Rather than argue that the Royal
N avy’s extra-legal trade interfered with their ability to protect the island, Hamilton went
on to argue that the ships of the Royal Navy engaged in commerce with Spanish
America, “to the discouragement o f that o f the merchants,” o f Jamaica.97 Hamilton’s later
successor, Governor Lawes, echoed a similar complaint about the N avy’s trading
activities along with his protests about the state o f the island’s security. According to
Lawes, the Royal Navy carried merchandise to Spanish America “which otherwise would
be done by vessells belonging to the Island, and consequently be a livelihood to numbers
of seafaring men, who now have not bread for want of employment, which is the chief
97 CSP 1712-1714, p. 123.
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occasion o f so many o f them going a pyrating.”98 In Lawes’ calculations, not only did the
Royal Navy neglect their duty to protect Jamaican shipping, but by cutting into the
interloping trade, the Navy further harmed the island by forcing its unemployed seamen
into piracy. Caught between the crosshairs of these competing commercial interests were
the port cities o f Spain’s American empire.
Similar to Patino’s manipulation o f the contraband trade for the good o f Spanish
imperial policy, the Royal N avy’s engagement in illicit trade served as a tool o f empire
which benefitted Kingston as much as London, despite complaints from Jamaican
officials. Smuggling by the Royal Navy reflected a wider British political philosophy
regarding free trade and open navigation o f the w orld’s oceans, a philosophy which
Jamaican interlopers themselves embraced. The point was an old one, argued effectively
by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, that the Atlantic was a mare liberum despite Spain’s
claims to dominion. According to Grotius, non-Iberian powers had no duty to respect
Spain’s claim to a mare clausem Atlantic in which trade and possession remained in the
hands of the “discoverers” in perpetuity. Taking Grotius’s seventeenth-century argument
further, the British Empire of the eighteenth century wanted much more than just the
ability to navigate the Atlantic, they wanted to right to ply their manufactured goods at
any port in that mare liberum. " The British Royal Navy brought the benefit of superior
arms to force such trade on Spanish America, benefitting all British subjects with an
interest in transimperial trade.

9SCSP, no. 272 (1717-18): 271.
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While the South Sea Company engaged in the asiento contract in the hope of
amassing wealth through access to Spanish American ports, such desires were largely
unattainable. The monopoly privileges of the Company also meant that Company traders
ostensibly operated within the confines of the law, unable to engage in the more
profitable free-trade of Jamaican interlopers.100 In response to these confines, British
negotiators sought and received permission for a license vessel of first 500, later 1,000,
tons to trade to Spanish America in synch with the annual Spanish trade fairs.101 In the
long run, however, the Kingston interlopers would far eclipse the South Sea Company in
supplying the Spanish Main with much-needed trade goods.102 The decline in the
profitability of the asiento contract for the South Sea Company in the years before the
outbreak o f the War o f Jenkins’ Ear coincided with a Whig-dominated political desire for
free trade in the Americas. Violence perpetrated against British mariners further added to
the calls for war against Spain, now seen worth the risk of losing the unprofitable asiento
contract.
The goal of attaining free trade in the Americas at the expense of the Spanish
monopoly was embraced by the Royal N avy’s leading commander in the Caribbean
during the War o f Jenkins’ Ear. Following his successful attack on Porto Bello in
November of 1739, Vernon wrote back to Sir Charles Wager to extoll his
accomplishment - the opening of a Spanish American port to British trade. According to
Vernon, Porto Bello served as one of, “the principal mart[s] for our merchants,” who
exchanged manufactured goods for bullion in the years, “before the establishing a South

100 See: Curtis N ettels, “England and the Spanish-A m erican Trade, 1680-1715,” Journal o f M odern History
.V o l. 3. No. 1 (Mar., 1931), pp. 1-32.
101 Nettels, “England and the Spanish-A m erican Trade,” p. 31.
102 Palmer, H um an Cargoes, pp. 158.
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Sea Company interrupted the private trade.” 103 A devotee to the notion of free trade,
Vernon appeared little concerned with the damage that interloping caused the South Sea
Company, despite the British Company’s monopoly on trade with Spanish America.
Vernon considered his principal task in Porto Bello to, “lay a solid foundation of
intercourse between our merchants and them, to recover so beneficial a trade to the
nation,” which he was able to argue had been a “success under my protection.” 104
Smuggling, rather than trading companies, embodied the Whig ideal upheld by men like
Vernon. In such a philosophy, the nation grew strong through the trade of manufactured
goods which were shipped by British vessels, thereby strengthening the Navy, and bought
with foreign bullion, thereby accruing wealth while weakening the enemy. The South Sea
Company, however, interrupted a flourishing trade in Porto Bello which Vernon stated
that he could, “remember flourishing here above thirty years ago,” and that he was able to
reassert by forcefully opening the port to interlopers.105
The popular celebrations which followed Vernon’s success at Porto Bello
epitomized the wider British sense of entitlement to free trade in the Americas. While
imperial planners in Britain recognized the truth in Lord Haversham’s argument that
trade and naval strength “both together are the wealth, strength, security and glory of
Britain,” the early decades o f the eighteenth century witnessed a popular enthusiasm for
maritime dominance. Much of this attention stemmed from the vociferous outcry of
merchants and their supporters in the press regarding guarda costa attacks. According to
historian Kathleen Wilson, daily conversations in Britain revolved around trade and the
103 Vernon to Sir Charles W ager [Strafford, in Porto Bello Harbour, April 5, 1740] in B. McL. Ranft, ed.
The Vernon Papers (Navy Records Society, London, England 1958): 86.
104 Vernon to Sir Charles W ager [Strafford, in Porto Bello Harbour, April 5, 1740] in B. McL. Ranft, ed.
The Vernon Papers (Navy Records Society, London, England 1958): 86.
105 Vernon to the Secretary o f the A dm iralty (Draft) [Burford, at Port Royal, May 26-31, 1740] in Ranft,
The Vernon Papers, p. 311.
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guarda costas as the people and Parliament agitated for revenge on the Spanish
Em pire.106 The lines, “Tame proud Iberia, shake ye Gallick throne,
Give freedom to the World, and keep her own,” from A Skit on Britain reflect such
popular sentiment. For Londoners, the British press, and Navy, free trade in the Americas
became an issue far more important than sheer econom ics.107 Rather, mare liberum in
terms of navigation and trade came to symbolize the very freedom and survival of the
British Empire. In this sense, Vernon fought for much more than just new markets for
British manufactures during the W ar o f Jenkins’ Ear.
Despite the pomp and rhetoric about the importance o f His M ajesty’s navy and
its very real role in defending British merchants from guarda costas harassment, men like
Edward Vernon found themselves undersupplied for their American deployments. Just as
M endinueta received orders which he could not fulfill without engaging in foreign
commerce, Vernon relied on smuggling and prize money to fill in the gaps in supply from
his superiors. In one such instance, Vernon requested, “bay frocks and trousers as very
proper for [the Caribbean] in the rainy seasons,” for his crew who experienced extreme
cold on night watch without them. Despite repeated inquiries regarding the clothing,
Vernon was only able to provide his men with the frocks and trousers by securing extranaval money to outfit his crew. W ith an average five percent fee charged to smugglers for
convoying their vessels or their goods, securing the funds himself proved far easier than
getting supplies through the regular channels.
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While carrying extralegal goods defied the wishes of the Admiralty Board and
opened British American ports up to foreign aggression, the trade was essential for the
maintenance o f His M ajesty’s ships in American waters. For Vernon, as for Mendinueta,
one of the primary concerns was receiving enough food to keep his men at sea. The main
ordinance store for the British Navy in the Caribbean was on the tropical island of
Jamaica, which meant that the majority of the foodstuffs needed by the Navy arrived
through North American trade channels. Yet, as Vernon complained to the Victualling
Board, “I am greatly apprehensive if they depend on [North American trade], his
M ajesty’s Forces will run the hazard o f starving here.” For, despite the bellicose language
of British North American merchants who complained of guarda costa attacks, Vernon
stated that those same merchants preferred to trade with possessions of the Spanish and
French crowns because the merchants received, “their payments from them either in
money, or commodities [and] they can get at lower prices.” 109 Some of the most basic
needs of the British Royal Navy - food and clothing - were met by the contraband trade,
despite clear regulations from the Admiralty Board prohibiting naval ships from carrying
on such commerce.
For both M endinueta and Vernon, providing adequately for their crews proved
even more important considering the competition prevalent in the eighteenth-century
Caribbean for competent seamen. Not only did men of the sea have their choice between
interlopers, privateers, and merchantmen of their own empire, but the maritime world
proved highly permeable between empires. As in the famous case of Edward Coxere,
who served on Spanish, Dutch, British, and Turkish ships before being taken prisoner by

1<wVernon to the Victualling Board (Draft) [B urford, at Sea, O ctober 4, 1740] in Ranft, The Vernon Papers,
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the Spanish, imperial subjecthood mattered little in the open blue waters o f the w orld’s
oceans.110 Even Vernon complained o f the “shock one to think there can be wretches as
abandon’d as even to desert the service o f God, as well as the Crown and their country,
by going over to the enemies o f our holy religion,” during the early stages o f the War of
Jenkins’ Ear. For Vernon, these seamen’s, “ingratitude is the more shameless, as a
principal view of this war, has been to secure our seamen from being prey to Spanish
Guarda Costas.'1'1And yet, instead of the prescribed capital punishment for such
desertion, Vernon granted the recalcitrant seamen a general pardon if they returned to
their British vessels.111 Vernon was not displaying uncharacteristic leniency by granting
deserting sailors a pardon but, rather, a pragmatic outlook in response to the constant
competition and wide market available to seamen.
While impressments filled the British N avy’s rosters, it remained up to individual
commanders to keep those men when the ships weighed anchor at various ports. Perhaps
for this reason, Captain Christopher O ’Brien argued that, “It is [the captain’s]
indispensible duty to see that the poor seamen be not wronged of his due, nor the service
carried on by noise, stripes or blows,” and “not the ship made the prison of, but where the
i i 'j

service requires immediate and constant attendance.” “ For men like Vernon,
“immediate and constant attendance” was mandatory to retain enough men to put ships
out each season. Despite the technical illegality of British Navy ships carrying
contraband trade, the minor transgression meant that Vernon supplied his men and kept
navy operations in the Caribbean running smoothly. While Vernon was a professed
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advocate for free trade, what the Spanish deemed contraband trade, he was also as
dependent on that trade as his Spanish counterpart at Cartagena. Both Vernon and
M endinueta competed for available seamen, thereby increasing their dependence on
contraband trade in order to provide their maritime crews with supplies.
With the participation of the British Royal Navy in the contraband trade to
Spanish America, violence in the years leading up to the War o f Jenkins’ Ear escalated
out of control. While the guarda costa fleets sailed with instructions to disrupt British
American shipping, they encountered more than just unarmed merchantmen. Nor were
Spanish American settlements free from harassment by their British counterparts. In
1715, the governor of Cuba complained to Governor Hamilton of Jamaica that several
vessels had been fitted out from that island and that, “some o f them had landed near
Havana and committed hostilities on the ships and dominions o f the King o f Spain.” 113
Even Rear Admiral Charles Stewart admitted that many of the British seamen who
complained about the depredations of the guarda costas were themselves guilty of illicit
trade and barbarity in Spain’s American possessions.114 Perhaps the greatest danger for
Spanish seamen seeking out British prizes came when they encountered not prizes, but
vessels of the Royal Navy. Such was the case when Captain W illiam Laws sailed the
Drake through the Windward Passage on a voyage to London. En route, the vessel was,
“attack’d by a Spanish Privateer, who took her for a Merchantman.” The mistake proved
costly to the unfortunate guarda costa when the Drake returned fire and sunk the other
ship, killing all those on board.115
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While British crews faced abuse, torture, and even death at the hands of guarda
costas, some Spanish American seamen risked a fate worse than each of those. While
many of the eighteenth-century’s seamen were mixed-race, men of African descent
onboard guarda costas faced enslavement at the hands of their British captors. After a
Spanish American seaman by the name of Juan Casado Valdes reported being imprisoned
by a Jamaican privateer who attempted to sell him into slavery, the governor of Cuba,
Alonso de Arcos Moreno, wrote the Council of the Indies. According to Moreno, the
widespread British practice of enslaving mixed-race Spanish American seaman, “will be
the cause of the end of [Spanish] privateering on these coasts, with the fear which has
gripped the free blacks and mulattos o f falling into slavery.” 116 For those free seamen of
mixed ancestry, encounters with British American mariners became struggles to maintain
their freedom and avoid enslavement on British soil. As a waystation for the transatlantic
slave trade, moreover, Jamaican markets sat poised to absorb men like Valdes. Such fears
comingled with the general British hysteria over the barbarity of the guarda costas,
sparking vicious battles when ships of the two empires encountered one another on the
high seas.

The Siege of Cartagena
Violence over the political economy of smuggling in the Caribbean came to a
head with the British invasion of Cartagena. The escalation of forces on either side of the
Caribbean increased pressure on already strained sources of supply for both Vernon and
Spanish Naval Admiral Bias de Lezo. In a letter from Lezo and intercepted by Vernon,
116 M arrero, Cuba: Economia y Sociedad, p. 35. Translation is my own.
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the Spanish commander demanded “a speedy supply o f above three hundred thousand
quintals o f beef, pork and dry provisions, and seventeen hundred barrels o f flour,” from
the French governor o f Leogane, L ’Amage. The order indicated to Vernon that, “it is
plain [Lezo] is greatly distressed for provisions.” 117 Yet, the free trade that Vernon and
his supporters encouraged in the Caribbean before the outbreak of the war proved
detrimental when the conflict got underway. For, even as Vernon celebrated Lezo’s lack
of supplies, he published orders in North American newspapers commanding the
cessation of the provisions trade to Spanish America. The New-York Weekly Journal,
among others, approved o f the measure and printed, “The Prohibition for Exporting o f
Provisions, to any foreign Parts is well received among the People here, it being Judg’d a
most effectual way of distressing our Enemies who are in great W ant thereof, and without
which their Fleets will be unable to put to Sea.” 118 Despite the seemingly unanimous
agreement with Vernon’s order, however, Cartagena stocked its garrisons in anticipation
of the siege with provisions from British American interlopers.119
In hindsight, the siege of Cartagena appears an odd choice for a major British
Navy operation. W ithin the larger political economy of the Spanish Empire, the port city
of Cartagena proved important because it possessed a very secure harbor for anchoring
the treasure fleets. British imperial planners were familiar with the formidable geography
and architecture of Cartagena both because of previous naval operations and the fact that
Cartagena served as a base for the South Sea Company. The success o f Cartagena’s
guarda costas pointed to a more vigorous imperial presence in the region and should
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have given Vernon and his superiors second thoughts about their proposed invasion. Yet,
just as eighteenth-century observers lamented the supposed venality of Spanish American
contraband trade, many only saw decay when they looked at Cartagena. Assumptions of
corruption, vice, and disloyalty among Spanish American officials, “portend\<zd] a fatal
revolution,” in the years leading up to Vernon’s amphibious assault, leading British
troops to rush headlong into a foolhardy mission on the Spanish M ain.120
Despite Vernon’s numerical superiority and Cartagena’s supposed weakness, the
invasion proved to be an unmitigated failure for the British. The troops and fleet arranged
to rendezvous on the island of Jamaica before proceeding on to the assault of Cartagena.
For many of the troops, however, their hiatus in Jamaica proved disastrous and many
succumbed to fever or sickened themselves on the island’s plentiful supply o f rum .121 The
disease environment of tropical Cartagena was no improvement over that of Jamaica and
was compounded by the mismanagement of such a large force on the part of Vernon and
Brigadier General Thomas Wentworth. Perhaps more damaging to V ernon’s assault,
however, was the robust and brilliant defense put up by the city’s soldiers and
inhabitants. Focusing their forces on the defense of St. Lazar, the Spanish defenders of
Cartagena sunk their own ships in the harbor to keep Vernon from positioning his ships
close enough to provide cover for British ground forces. The British were further lulled
into complacency regarding the invasion when they handily took Boca Chica Castle and
19 9

St. Joseph’s Fort, finding, “only three drunken Spaniards,” at the latter. “ The same
would not be true of St. Lazar. There, rather than fleeing to the British banner,
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Cartagena’s defenders fought their last stand to repulse the invaders. Too late to save the
lives of hundreds of invaders, Vernon would come to understand where the residents of
Cartagena’s loyalties lay.
Yet, V ernon’s painful lesson seems lost in much o f the scholarship on contraband
trade and the War o f Jenkins’ Ear. Throughout the eighteenth century, as argued by
scholar Richard Pares, Spanish American officials in places like Cartagena used the
excuse of British violence to explain the rampant contraband trade in their dominions.
For historians looking in, commercial violence proved little more than, “expiatory ritual,”
to mask complicity and venality from metropolitan eyes.123 W ithout a doubt, some
Spanish American officials covered their own participation in the smuggling for personal
profit.124 However, sweeping condemnation of men like Mendinueta distorts the wider
Spanish political economy in which they were forced to operate. Moreover, seeing
violence as a mere pretext for illicit trade brushes aside the very real bloodshed which
became normative in the early decades of the eighteenth century. Worse, blindness to the
ways in which illicit or extralegal trade was used by Spanish imperial actors has led to a
misinterpretation, both then and now, o f the siege o f Cartagena and the port’s successful
defense.
Violent encounters between guar da costas and British American seamen in the
circum-Caribbean illuminate the ways in which contraband trade served as a tool of
Britain and Spain’s trans-imperial political economy. Rather than seeing illicit trade
between subjects of disparate empires as a clandestine but unavoidable evil, the
123 Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, 1739-1763 (London 1963): 6.
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smuggling activities of M endinueta and Vernon point to the ways in which illegal inter
imperial trade could serve the purposes of metropolitan planners. M endinueta supplied
the guarda costas with illicit wheat in order to defend the strategically important port of
Cartagena. Furthermore, M endinueta’s guarda costas accomplished the broader task of
harassing British shipping which allowed Patino to successfully push his patron’s Italian
designs at the negotiating table. The British Royal Navy entered the Atlantic in part as a
response to guarda costa harassment of British shipping. Yet, naval commanders like
Vernon remained too undersupplied to maintain well-fed and, even more importantly,
well-paid crews in the competitive eighteenth-century maritime world. Carrying
contraband trade in vessels of his royal Majesty bridged supply gaps and moved forward
British free-trade designs in Spanish American port cities. Rather than venal officials
operating for their personal enrichment, both M endinueta and Vernon utilized the
contraband trade as an instrument of empire while simultaneously producing the need for
more smuggling and eventual conflict.
The War o f Jenkins’ Ear ended Britain’s possession o f the asiento contract and
led to the financial collapse of the South Sea Company, bringing about an economic and
political scandal that reverberated throughout Britain. The conflict was subsumed in the
near-global outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession that waged for another
decade. Despite war and in the return of peace, Cartagena remained reliant on trans
imperial trade connections from throughout the Caribbean basin. The commercial ties
between Cartagena and Jamaica continued in the later decades of the eighteenth century,
slowing only when the American Revolution cut Jamaica off from its former supply of
foodstuffs and as the island’s sugar production eclipsed all other economic activity in the
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wake of the Haitian Revolution. The world of Caribbean contraband trade cannot be
easily separated from the political machinations of imperial planners. Illicit economic
relations could and were used in order to enact violence upon or wage war against the
very sources of those supplies. W ar and violence in the eighteenth-century Caribbean
meshed imperceptibly with illicit commerce and smuggling. As Vernon discovered,
smuggling and imperial loyalty coexisted without contradiction on the peripheries of
empire.
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